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KOSUGI Yasushi*
Introduction
This article aims to provide an overview of Japanese Studies on the Islamic world and Muslim 
societies in the last half-century, and to contextualize them in historical, social, economic and 
political terms. Since these are rather personal reflections, I will not attempt to document or 
provide evidence as to what I have observed personally in the midst of the intellectual milieu 
of Japan.
The “last half-century” at this point indicates 1967–2017. One easily notices that the 
year of 1967 marked the very beginning of both the end of Arab nationalism and the rise 
of the Islamic revival. It also coincided more or less with the revival of academic studies 
on Islam, Muslim societies and the Middle East in Japan. One important indication, among 
others, was that, in 1967, the Association for Islamic Studies in Japan, established four years 
earlier, was officially recognized as an incorporated association under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My being in the field for more than 45 years during this era may 
justify my writing this article as a personal witness.1
Japan as a whole, since the very beginning of modernization, has been doing its best to 
absorb Western knowledge, while developing its own East Asian tradition. In Islam-related 
studies, it established itself by absorbing the Orientalist’s achievements, from both Western 
European and North American resources in the early modern times, and developed its own 
way by accessing directly to scholars and resources in Islamic countries. While it combines 
both Western and Islamic sources, developing a uniquely Japanese domain of academic and 
intellectual tradition, it has been very reluctant in reciprocating its achievements either to the 
West or to the Islamic world. The reason is obvious, since Japan as a mono-lingual nation has 
a large domestic educated population, all scholars and researchers have to respond first to the 
market needs of their mother-tongue speakers.
The recent urge to disseminate scientific findings in the international media, under the 
current globalization, has been fairly successful in various branches of natural or medical 
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1 My academic involvement in various capacities may qualify me as a witness of the era, such as being 
one of the proposers to establish the Japan Association for Middle East Studies in 1984, and becoming later 
its fifth President (2003–2005), being involved in establishing the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at the 
International University of Japan in 1985, initiating the department of the Study of the Islamic World in the 
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sciences in Japan. In the fields under discussion, however, historians and researchers in other 
branches of humanities and social sciences have been slow to respond to globalization, since 
the domestic demands are still very strong in their fields.
1. The impacts of two “Oil Crises”
In the 1960’s and early 70’s, Japanese studies on Muslim societies tended to be less Islam-
oriented, and more concerned with nationalism and modernization. It was high time for 
Asian and African countries to achieve independence or demand political liberation from 
colonial domination by the Western powers, and they themselves were more concerned with 
national and modernizing tasks. Rather than being Islamic or Muslim, they were speaking the 
languages of national self-determination and anti-colonialism, Asian and African solidarity 
or non-alignments, or the Third World alliance. There was a very strong assumption of the 
secularization theory, in most of the social sciences, that all societies would become more 
secular with modernization and Westernization, and that religions would sooner or later lose 
their social and political force.
The fourth Middle East War and the accompanying “oil embargo” in 1973 brought 
the first oil crisis to the industrialized oil-consumer countries, and Japan was hit severely. 
Japan’s “post-war miracle” or economic development at a startling pace, with its rewarding 
achievements at Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964 and Expo in Osaka in 1970, was suddenly 
halted by the oil crisis. Japan had to realize that its economic performance had depended on 
a supply of cheap oil from the Middle East. As a consequence, Japan decided to adopt a pro-
Arab policy, rather displeasing to its American ally, who was in turn Israel’s ally in the Middle 
East.
Because of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an Arab rhetoric of the cause of the 
war from the Arab side and the initiation of the oil embargo by OAPEC (Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries), as well as the academic emphasis on Arab nationalism in 
those days, Japan received these happenings as an Arab event. They failed to realize that the 
“October War” was for the Arabs also the “Ramadan War” fought as Jihad by their soldiers.
In 1979, the dramatic “come-back” of Islam surprised not only Japan but most of the 
world when a revolution occurred in what was supposedly the strongest monarchy in the Gulf 
region, Iran, and it soon turned out to be an Islamic revolution under the leadership of a high 
ranking Islamic jurist, Ayatollah Khomeini. The initial calls for “Islamic revival” had begun, 
retrospectively, in the late 19th century, and after many decades of less “visible” efforts, the 
latest waves of revival started in the late 1960’s, only to manifest in political dimensions in 
the late 70’s.
As a surprise to those who wanted to see it as an exceptional event, or nationalist 
uprising in a religious disguise, many subsequent events proved that something odd had 
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started in the Middle East. To cite just a few, we may recall an armed rebellion in Makka 
against the Saudi Arabian regime in November 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 
following month, triggering a wide national struggle against the Soviet army by “Mojahideen” 
fighters, and the assassination of President Sadat of Egypt by Jihad Organization in October 
1981 for his peacemaking with Israel.
In the 1980’s, there was confusion and chaos in the academic sphere. How should we 
interpret such a come-back of religion? Was Iran the exception which contradicted the general 
rule? Or, was Islam itself incompatible with, and inevitably rebelling against the advancing 
tide of modernity?
There were many sincere scholars and over-night (often self-proclaimed) specialists 
who proposed alternative schemes and concepts to grasp the new phenomena. Some of the 
proposals were sincere, but insufficient, and some of them were absurd, and create more 
cognitive problems, rather than solutions. One of the complications was, both in the West and 
in Japan, that the mass media entered the field, and started to demand feasible interpretations 
from specialists or to seek their own interpretations to fit the taste of their readers and viewers. 
For the scholars and researchers of Islam and Muslim societies, being kept in the shade until 
then, this was an unprecedented situation.
It seems that, in the West, two technical terms came to the fore after much confusion: 
“Islamic fundamentalism,” and later “political Islam.” The Japanese mass media were 
quick to pick up the term “Islamic fundamentalism.” This was partly due to its circulation 
in the Western media, and partly because of its novelty and usefulness. There was however 
a problem. It appeared to be a new term conjured to explain a new phenomenon for the 
Japanese reader and audience.
2. Japanese Proposal: Islamic Revival
It goes without saying that Islamic fundamentalism was a metaphor or a borrowing to explain 
something comparable. It’s being so was easy to understand in America in particular, where 
the term “fundamentalism” started within the protestant tradition, or in Western Christian 
society in general. Japanese media, lacking knowledge common to the Christians,2 ignored 
the standard translation of (Christian) fundamentalism used in Japanese Christina circles, 
“konponshugi,” and created a literal translation, “genrishugi.” 
As mentioned earlier, the two oil crises awakened the Japanese society to its dependence 
on oil and other raw materials for its industries, and to its vulnerability in the international 
setting. Two oil crises, combined together, indicated the importance of the Middle East as 
a region and Islam as a religion, or Islam as a political, economic, social and cultural force. 
2 Only 1 percent or so of the Japanese population is Christian. Culturally, Christian influence is stronger 
than this figure indicates, but not to the degree that an ordinary Japanese has heard of “fundamentalism.”
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The establishment of the Japan Association for Middle East Studies in 1984 was certainly a 
response to such a social awareness.
In the inaugurating annual conference of the Association,3 the main panel discussion 
was organized on “Islam Fukko Undo,” or the “Islamic Revival Movements.” This was a 
Japanese alternative for Islamic fundamentalism. It was not just another way of expressing the 
same phenomena, but a totally different scheme to apprehend what was really going on in the 
Islamic world. In order to “gain an overall perspective on the Islamic revival and analyze it 
properly, it is important that our definition includes economic and cultural movements as well 
as those that pose an immediate political threat, and that we refrain from labeling hat revolves 
around the latter” [Kosugi 1993: 117].
In this scheme, Islam is rather broadly defined, and therefore, contemporary phenomena 
of the Islamic revival are broadly envisaged. Once we say “fundamentalism,” we are 
concerned with militancy, and our imaginations are caught by threatening elements. For one, 
our imagination will not be extended to Islamic banking, since this economic endeavor by 
business people cannot be equated with militancy or a threat. And yet it is quite legitimately 
part of the Islamic revival, which comprises all efforts and means to revive Islamic values in 
contemporary societies.
3. National Joint Projects on the Islamic World
Any article on the development of Islamic studies or Middle East Studies in Japan cannot 
go without mentioning the name of Professor Yuzo Itagaki (1931–). Back in the 1970’s, his 
intellectual activities paved the way for Japanese society to understand that the “Arab cause” 
was meant to apprehend the Palestine Question. In the 1980’s, he was very instrumental in 
establishing the Japan Association for Middle East Studies, and served as its first Secretary 
General, and later, as the second President. He was also instrumental in establishing the Asian 
Federation of Middle East Studies Associations in 1995.
In 1987, Professor Itagaki initiated a large research project on “Urbanism in Islam.” 
Enduring for three years, it organized many national and international conferences and 
published substantial publications. Prior to this, in the humanities and social sciences in 
Japan, large projects funded by governmental agencies had not been common, but his project 
pioneered such projects and became a proto-type for subsequent ones in the fields related to 
Islam.
Focusing on urbanism, or the urban origins of Islam and the urban civilization it created, 
this project clearly suggested an antithesis to obsolete images of Islam being a nomadic 
religion or a religion of warriors. The unique nature of the project was that it gathered 
nationally not only specialists on the Islamic world but also many scholars on China and the 
3 In the University of Tokyo, April 1985.
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West, the two poles of historical and civilizational studies in Japan. The exchanges made 
among them created an atmosphere of mutual recognition, since Islamic studies had not been 
considered as civilizational in the way that Western or Chinese studies had been treated.
The international conferences and seminars of the project invited distinguished scholars 
from Europe and America, as well as from the Islamic countries. They came into this closed 
world of Japanese scholarship, which was absorbing enthusiastically and disseminating only 
occasionally, and found there an expected accumulation of knowledge, sometimes in rather 
unique ways.
As I recall, famous scholars from Western countries were often invited, in the early 
days, for lectures in Tokyo. At one time, one of them happened to give a very basic lecture, 
appropriate for a novice audience, then in a Q&A session, he found the audience was actually 
a specialized one well versed in his academic works. This instance was quite indicative of the 
closed nature of Japanese academia.
In 1997, with a stronger awareness of the need for Islam-related studies from the 
government side, a much larger project was initiated under the leadership of Professor 
Tsugitaka Sato. It was called “Islamic Area Studies (IAS),” aiming to collect information and 
create a computerized information system in order to enhance understanding of the Islamic 
world. Its formal objectives were to “discover new approaches in Islamic Area studies through 
the accumulation of primary data related to Islamic civilization and Muslim contemporary 
issues,” “to develop a computer system suitable for multilateral Islamic Area Studies,” and “to 
support and encourage the formation of a new generation of scholars.” 
In the first objective, the phrase to “discover new approaches” is combined with 
“accumulation of primary data related to Islamic civilization and Muslim contemporary 
issues.” This indicates a Japanese wish to create non-Orientalist alternative approach 
based studies of primary sources. The second objective was meant to update the academia, 
especially “analogue scholars,” to the digitalized internet age. The third objective was to 
strengthen the graduate studies in fields related to the Islamic world.
These objectives, especially the first and third, were incorporated in the newly established 
Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies (ASAFAS) at Kyoto University in 1998. 
Founding members of its section (later, an independent department) of the Study of the 
Islamic World were active in the Islamic Area Studies Project.
Collecting primary sources was considered pivotal to the IAS Project, and ASAFAS 
took a lead in this respect.  Within five years of its inception, it had created the largest Arabic 
collection in Japan. And later the second largest Urdu collection in the world was acquired 
and, by 2016, its cataloguing was complete.
The IAS Project came to a close in March 2002. Its achievements were well received, 
but on the other hand, one serious flaw was recognized. As a research project, it was not 
03英特_01_kosugi_ver3.indd   7 2017/03/27   15:05:38
8Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 10 (March 2017)
designed to build an institution. When it came to an end, networks constructed during the 
project became malfunctioning. Against this backdrop, a new Islamic Area Studies project was 
inaugurated in 2006, supported by Japan’s National Institutes for Humanities (NIHU). This 
time, it aimed at establishing five research centers of Islamic Area Studies in four universities 
and one Oriental library.
One of them, the Center for Islamic Area Studies at Kyoto University, known as KIAS, 
was attached to ASAFAS, and therefore connected with the graduate studies in a direct 
manner.  After ten years of expanding activities, KIAS entered into a new cooperation with 
NIHU in 2016, when a new research project of “Modern Middle East Studies” began. The 
phase of institution building was judged to be complete, as a national network of research 
institutions and scholars is fully operational.
4. The Main Stream in the Islamic World?
Throughout these years, the present author has been engaged, with various colleagues, to 
survey and clarify the nature of the contemporary Islamic world and its “main stream,” if 
there is one. 
The concept of Islamic revival suggests that the revival is not meant as that of Islam, 
since Islam is a name of a mass of both the abstract and the real, but rather that of the Umma. 
Then, we must ask ourselves if the Umma, as a universal / international /cross-border 
community of Muslims, is an abstract idea or a reality in the international society. The answer 
must be both affirmative and negative at the same time, since the Umma as an Islamic ideal 
may stay abstract if there are not practical activities to transform the ideal to a reality. The 
establishment and continuation of OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference; Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation since 2011), for example, indicates both the ideal of Umma on which 
this international organization is firmly based on one hand, and the frustrating reality of the 
political fragmentation of the Umma on the other.
The very idea of the leaders of the Umma discussing its crucial issues was addressed in 
a work of ʻAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, Umm al-Qurā, or Makkan Conference, as I prefer 
to render it, in 1900. He was one of the Manarists, or the loose group of intellectuals whose 
major mouthpiece was the journal Al-Manār [Kosugi 2006: 6–11]. Its leader, Muḥammad 
Rashīd Riḍā continued to publish this journal from 1898 to 1935, and dedicated his life to 
disseminating the ideas of his two mentors, al-Afghānī and ʻAbduh. Al-Manār was circulated 
from Java in the East to Morocco in the West, publishing ideas and news from various parts of 
the Umma, or actually transforming the ideal Umma into a practical theater of Islamic reform 
through this print medium.
One may argue that the fact of OIC members being the sovereign members of the United 
Nations betrays the ideal of the single Umma, and serves as a cover-up to conceal the actual 
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acceptance of the concept of “nation-state,” alien to Islam, by today’s Muslims. However, 
both the Islamic solidarity and the intervention by the name of Islam among the Muslim 
countries strongly suggest that there is a dimension of Umma polity between the external and 
the internal in the conventional sense of international relations.
Al-Kawākibī proposed to make an Arab khalīfa (caliph) the head of a federation of 
Muslim countries to preserve the unity of the Umma. Rashīd Riḍā proposed to revive an 
Islamic caliphate as he envisioned in the last days of the Ottoman caliphate, serialized in 
Al-Manār in 1922–23. This journal, Al-Manār, or the “lighthouse,” was sending light, so 
to speak, into the stormy dark sea in those days, since Islamic reformers were disparately 
struggling against the forceful tides of modern ideas flowing from the Western sources.
In the words of Rashīd Riḍā, they posed themselves as the “moderate reformist 
party” between the conservative Islamic traditionalists on the one side and the Westernizers 
(mutafarnijūn) on the other. Although they tried to take a centrist position, Islamic trends 
as a whole were increasingly marginalized within the ideological spectrum of the day. 
Nationalism, liberalism and socialism were rising.
Malcolm Kerr stated in his work on Islamic reform in the middle of the 1960’s, “Rather 
than Islamic loyalties assimilating nationalism and secular institutions, it would be more to 
the point to say that the latter have assimilated Islam.” [Kerr 1966: 221]
It was only after the defeat of the Arab front against Israel in 1967 and the subsequent 
decline of secular Arab nationalism, that what was in the underground flow of Islamic revival 
started to manifest on the surface. The Islamic revival brought Islam back to the main stream 
of social life and political ideas, but it was not strong enough to wipe the other tides out. So, 
the Islamic world has been in a divided state with three major forces stretching it in different 
directions. These three major forces are modernization / Westernization, nationalism and 
Islamic revival. This state of affairs continues to this day.
Within the Islamic revival, do we observe “mainstreaming” or “fragmentation”? As 
far as the ideas, or the sets of Islamic ideals, are concerned, the “revival” actually involves 
three different elements: First, renewal and reform of Islamic understanding and its practices, 
second, adaptation and Islamization of the modern or the Western, and, third, revitalization of 
the traditional.
To cite a few examples: The so-called “trio” of Islamic reform [Hourani 1983], namely, 
al-Afghāni, ‘Abduh and Riḍā (roughly from the 1870’s to the 1930’s), represents the first, 
with a strong favor of the second. The clearest example of the second is Islamic finance and 
banking from the 1970’s onward. Reinstitution of the ulama organizations or revival of Sufi 
orders can be seen as the third. These three transform themselves in time and they often merge 
in one way or another. For example, the ulama retained their social function after the 1960’s, 
partly because of the Islamic revival at the popular plain which brought a new market for 
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Islamic discourses, but their “traditional” discourses were very close to that of the reformers 
in the early 20th century. Sufi orders for their part  had become more Sharia compliant by this 
time, less traditional compared with what they were a half century earlier.
Despite differences among them, they constitute all together the revived Islamic trend 
within a Muslim society, as a rival to more secular trends. My hypothesis was, and is, as it 
still needs further verification, that these were in the process of forming a majority, and there 
would be a majority trend of moderation sooner or later, perhaps within a century. Why and 
how should we hold such a hypothesis?
5. The Umma’s market mechanism of ideas
Works of the present author as a student of Islamic studies involve the first three centuries 
of Islam, while as a student of political science I have been engaged with Middle Eastern 
/ Islamic politics in the 19th to 21st centuries. What binds the two eras is the history of 
Islamic thought, stretching from Kitāb al-Kharāj by Abū Yūsuf 4 in the 8th century to the 
contemporary Islamic leaders.
Two issues attracted me especially, namely, the historical developments of tafsīr (Quranic 
exegesis)5 and the rise, competition and final formation of schools of law (madhāhib).6 From 
the historical observation, a hypothetical scheme came out. It is what I call the Umma’s 
market mechanism of ideas. This scheme is also an answer to a long standing question of why 
Islam lacks the clergy and the church organization.
When we make comparisons among the three major “world religions,” namely, 
Buddhism, Christianity and Islam, a startling difference stands out between the first two 
and the last one: Separation of the clergy and the lay members, or the dualism of the sacred 
and the profane, and the hierarchical order and authority of the clergy organization (temple / 
church), and a total lack of these in Islam.
We usually resort to saying that, although there isn’t a clergy hierarchy in the exact 
sense, there are the ulama, the learned, especially the fuqaha (jurists; singular is faqih), who 
more or less function as an equivalent to the clergy. This answer apparently misses the most 
important question, “who makes them such dignitaries?” A church or a temple organization 
has a central authority who at the top of their hierarchy appoint the rest of functionaries in 
the organization. There are also ecumenical councils which decide what is orthodox and 
what is not. In Islam, the ulama started as private individuals, and earned later the trust and 
4 Its preface, addressed to Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd, was the first written document of political thought in 
the precise sense. See [Ībish and Kosugi 2005].
5 I have discussed the historical and typological classification of classical, modern and contemporary 
tafsīrs in [Kosugi 1994b].
6 I have elaborated the question of why and how these schools rose, competed with some becoming 
triumphant, while others lost the competition and became un-used in [Kosugi 2011:304–324].
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recognition of society through their socio-religious contributions. For an example, Abū 
Ḥanīfa, the founding father of the Ḥanafī school of law, the largest of the all Islamic legal 
schools today, numerically speaking, was a silk merchant. He was sustaining his livelihood 
and that of his pupils through his trade.
Did the caliphs as the politico-religious leaders of the Umma have that kind of central 
authority, when they held a real political power in the first few centuries? Yes, but not 
ultimately. Students of Islamic history are familiar with what happened with the Miḥna (trial). 
Abbasid caliph Ma’mūn adopted the rationalist Mu‘tazilite theology, especially the doctrine 
of the creation of the Qur’an, as an official one in 833, and tried to suppress those who 
disagreed with his policy. This process of prosecution, or miḥna, continued for around fifteen 
years under three Abbasid caliphs. Ibn Ḥanbal, the founding father of the Ḥanbalī school of 
law, resisted this policy and was severely suppressed for doing so. However, his stanch stand 
earned popular support and made his position triumphant, leading to the Abbasid decision to 
adopt the creed which the populace had accepted and followed.
At the same time, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī departed the Mu‘tazilte school and become 
its stanchest critic, supporting the cause of Ibn Ḥanbal. Although there was a substantial 
difference between these two scholars, both the Asha‘arī school of theology and the Ḥanbalī 
school of law later become an integral part of what we know as the Sunnis, or the absolute 
majority of Muslims (90% or so today).
It seems apparent from these events that the Umma itself, not the caliph as the formal 
head of the Umma, had the ultimate authority in Islamic affairs. However, the Umma did not, 
and does not, have a formal decision making body. How can we know its decision?
Certainly, Islam is not democracy, especially in matters related to creed and law. Even 
today, votes and polls have no place in Islamic creed and law. So, the hypothetical scheme 
is a “market mechanism.” Of course, this is a metaphor, and you may suspect the naming 
comes from the popularity of market mechanism in the post-Cold War era. It stems rather 
from the mercantile nature of Makkan society at the very birth of Islam. The Qur’an speaks 
of the benefits of faith (īmān) in trade terms, for example, “O ye who believe! Shall I show 
you a commerce that will save you from a painful doom ? Ye should believe in Allah and His 
messenger, and should strive for the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives. That 
is better for you, if ye did but know” [al-Qur’an 61:10, Chapter of the Ranks, Verse 10–11, 
English translation by Marmaduke Pickthall]. Islamic economies were historically market-
oriented, though not capitalist, and this metaphor must be more appropriate to Islam than to 
others.
In this market of Umma, the political and intellectual leaders offer their ideas and 
interpretations, and test their “products” through the acceptance of the populace, or al-sawād 
al-a‘ẓam (the great majority, the mass), of the Umma. In the market, the Muslims show their 
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preference through adoption and attachment to the ideas they are convinced of, as consumers 
would show their preference by purchase.
A quick note: A “market” meant here is a real one in our society, not an ideal type 
in economics where the law of demand and supply produces equilibrium through price 
mechanism. In our society, a market has other interventions, such as governmental subsidies 
or consumers’ oral advertising for their favorite commodities, among others.
In early centuries, we have observed a rather quick rise and fall of schools of law, such 
as the Jarīrī School7 and the Awzā‘ī School,8 as well as the prosperity and final decline of the 
Ẓāhirī school of law. From the 1950’s onward, the Islamic revival was accompanied by what 
I call “Fiqh Renaissance,”9 and many classical works of Islamic law were brought back in 
new forms. Legal encyclopedias are one of such forms. An Egyptian encyclopedia10 combines 
eight authentic schools of law, namely, the five Sunni schools of Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʻī, 
Ḥanbalī and Ẓāhirī (now malfunctioning but fully documented), the two Shiite schools of 
Jaʻfarī and Zaydī schools,11 and the Ibāḍī school (a moderate Kharijite school). Works of 
earlier schools and scholars were compiled by the great efforts of Qal‘ajī.12
The same scheme of market mechanism explains why and how certain Quranic exegeses 
succeeded in gaining popular acceptance and endure to this day, while some others were 
accepted only to a limited extent, if not rejected as irrelevant and unconvincing.
By the 16–17th centuries, the Islamic market of ideas reached a state of monopoly or 
oligopoly, and the market became very stable. Today’s confessional map of the Islamic world 
stems from this era. Religious stability should be positively appreciated when a society and a 
polity are stable. With the advent of the Western powers, this stability was negatively dubbed 
as “stagnation,” or even “backwardness.” In market scheme terms, we may say that the market 
became unstable due to fierce competition from newer products. This time, however, the 
products were not just Islamic ideas. Many modern ideas, alien to Islam, flew into this market.
7 Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī is recognized as the greatest early scholar of Qur’anic exegesis and history, but his 
legal standing lost the competition. His school is known either as the Jarīrī School or the Ṭabarī School.
8 Al-Awzā‘ī was born in Baalbak in present-day Lebanon, and his school is also characterized as Syrian 
School. Its influence was extended westward under the Umayyad dynasty, and the judges belonging to this 
school officiated in Syria until 811/812, and in Andalus until 950/951. It was finally overshadowed by the 
Mālikī School [Kosugi 2011: 305–309].
9 In the sense that Renaissance in the West brought back classical literatures.
10 It has reached the 33rd volume, a half century after launching the first one, yet this is just one tenth 
or so of the projected whole. Meanwhile, a Kuwaiti encyclopedia with 45 volumes has been circulated and 
appreciated.
11 Jaʻfarī and Zaydī schools of law represent respectively Ithnā ʻAsharī School and Zaydī School in 
terms of creed. The former is today’s main stream Shiism and forms majority in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. The 
latter dominates Northern Yemen.
12 Muḥammad Rawwās al-Qal‘ajī compiled encyclopedic volumes on legal opinions of the notable first 
generations, such as Abū Hurayra, ‘Ā’isha, ‘Alī, al-Awzā‘ī, Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Ibn Mas‘ūd, Ibrahīm al-Nakh‘ī, 
al-Layth ibn Sa‘d, Sufyān al-Thawrī, al-Ṭabarī, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, and Uthmān ibn ‘Affān.
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From our past experiences of the Umma’s market mechanism, one may draw a few 
conventional wisdoms. This market tends to bring forth a majority and to reduce differences. 
A thousand years ago, there were numerous schools and sects, as recorded in Milal wa Nihal 
(religions and sects) literatures. With the passing of time, they were substantially reduced in 
number, while differences were reduced mostly to a mutually tolerable degree. The problem 
of sectarianism in the Middle East today is apparently connected to the vitality of religious 
conviction, socio-economic benefits of religious / sectarian affiliation, and subsequent 
political violence. It does not, however, indicate sectarian fragmentation. The tendency is to 
hammer out more uniformity rather than splitting out. This is in very sharp comparison with 
an ever increasing number of Christian or Buddhist denominations.
This tendency of majority formation is also accompanied by “consensus making,” when 
possible. However, since it has no formal institution to decide, it takes time to determine what 
the market, or the Umma, has chosen. It can be a half century before a final consensus is 
made, not a decade or two. With modern technologies of communication, adding more recent 
ascending ICT technologies, communication seems easier, but this ease may create more 
arguments and conflicts.
There is an issue of who are the producers of the ideas. In pre-modern eras, they were 
invariably ulama in the traditional sense. In the mass societies of the 20th century, teachers, 
social activists, scientist-turned Islamic leaders and other intellectuals, who received secular, 
not traditional Islamic, training entered the market. Universal education also brought a new 
generation of the literate, both self-taught Islamists and secularists.
6. The State of Affairs in the Current Market of Islamic Ideas
We can see a fluctuating market of Islamic ideas in various fields. One important domain is, 
without doubt, politics. What is an Islamic government in contemporary conditions? At the 
demise of the Ottoman caliphate, Rashīd Riḍā argued to restore a truly Islamic caliphate. 
The Islamic Liberation Party, active to this day since its establishment in 1953, has been 
advocating the Muslim duty to reestablish the caliphate. A violent armed organization, the so-
called Islamic State, declared a new caliphate in parts of war-torn Syria and Iraq in 2015. The 
majority of ulama, however, do not subscribe to the view that Muslims should cling to the 
ideal of caliphate.
Either Islamic polity should be a monarchy or a republic, depending on who is arguing. 
Traditional support for monarchial polity has been lost in most of the Muslim countries, but 
is still vivid in the remaining monarchies. The Islamic revolution of Iran brought a radical 
Shiite version of Islamic republicanism. Two other Islamic republics are Sunni,13 and have 
quite different temperaments. “Is it legitimate to have a Muslim nation-state?” is also a valid 
13 Mauritania and Pakistan.
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question. All in all, a consensus in the political domain is far from being achieved. However, 
there has developed a consensus, in the last four decades or so, that any Islamic government 
must enforce Sharia in one form or another.
In the domain of economics, one of the most important questions was “is bank interest 
a prohibited riba?” The legal arguments started when post office saving and conventional 
(Western) banking entered the Islamic world in the late 19th century. Even after the 
establishment of Islamic banks in the 70’s and 80’s, the question continued to dominate the 
legal debate on Islamic economics. Since the 1990’s, the triumph of those who maintained 
that all bank interests are riba has become apparent, while Islamic financial institutions hold 
their customers firmly.
In other aspects of Islamic finance, many issues are under debate. Since Islamic finance 
is based on the Islamization of modern financial products, the legality of some of these new 
products must be challenged. Furthermore, in the wider scope of Islamic economics, which 
should encompass all economic domains of Muslim life, there many untouched domains, 
awaiting academic attention.14
Islamic medical ethics has a practical dimension, since medical doctors equipped 
with modern medicine await Islamic answers to validate their newly acquired technologies 
for Muslim patients. Organ transplantation is such an issue. There were many negative, or 
skeptical, legal opinions until the 1980’s, but a consensus was established in recent decades 
that the principle of life maintenance can override other secondary considerations, and that 
they can employ the methods of organ transplantation as long as it does not endanger the life 
of donor.15
Surveying these domains and their issues informs us, first, that the Islamic market of 
ideas and legal opinions is largely fluctuating, though majority formation is functioning in some 
domains. This may prove the hypothetical scheme of market mechanism is working, though it 
is too early to forecast what consensus can be seen at the middle of the 21st century. Second, 
the entire globe, or mankind as a whole, lives in a fluctuating world, with the uncertainty 
14 To cite some, the traditional domains of Islamic economies, some of which are often vividly practiced 
even today, include 1) zakāt and ṣadaqa, 2) inheritance, 3) social welfare based on takāful, 4) waqf, 5) Qarḍ 
Ḥasan, and 6) Mosque-based community activities. New domains and their achievements in recent decades 
include 7) Islamic finance, 8) Islamic banking, 9) Islamic insurance, 10) Islamic investment, 11) zakāt of 
Islamic financial industry, 12) contemporary financial instruments, such as muḍāraba, mushāraka, murābaḥa, 
ijāra, ṣukūk and the like, 13) Sharia compliance, 14) standardization of Islamic financial products, and 15) 
Islamic version of corporate social responsibility. Emerging domains and tasks ahead include 16) Islamic 
hotels and tourism, 17) ḥalāl food industries, 18) marriage fund, 19) Islamic microfinance, 19) redefinition 
of poverty and institutional remedy for the socially deprived, 20) cottage industries, 21) Islamic agricultural 
development, and 22) ecologically sustainable development based on Islamic visions. This list is a modified 
version of one in [Kosugi 2014].
15 In case of transplantation from the diseased, the dignity of the corpse was overridden. Before the 
establishment of the medical viability of transplantation, putting a scalpel into the corpse could not be 
justified for the sake of the noble cause of life preservation.
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of globalization, rapid technological developments, and the “clash of civilizations,” if we 
accept this term. Islamic legal opinions must fluctuate if the target realities of the world are 
fluctuating.
7. Political Islam and the Post 9.11 Era
Japanese academia, by the end of the 20th century, largely accepted “Islamic revival,” “Islamic 
revival movements” and “Islamic area studies” as specialist terminology, while “Islamism” 
was also recognized in political studies. “Islamic fundamentalism” was still popular among 
the Japanese mass media.
The 9.11 event changed the landscape. The attacks were branded in terms of “terror,” 
and “war on terror” was declared by the George Bush (Jr.) Administration. “Fundamentalist” 
was replaced with “terrorist.” In the Western academia, “political Islam” was employed as 
a more objective term, and this survived the 9.11 era. Rather, with the spread of radical and 
extremist groups of political Islam, it become more relevant as an analytical term.
Political Islam is, from the perspective of the present author, a political dimension of 
the Islamic revival, and therefore, a valid concept. “Islamism,” as a contemporary political 
ideology in Islam, and “Islamic politics” as politics where legitimization and politicization 
were based on an interplay of Islamic terms, are also valid and useful concepts. However, 
there are two inherent problems, when seen from the studies of Islamic revival.
The first is its concentration on the political, and the dislocation of politics from the rest 
of the Islamic revival. For example, Islamic economics is completely out of focus, when one 
speaks political Islam. Zakāt, or almsgiving and social welfare based on it, is an integral part 
of Islamic economics, and this works to help the needy and the poor with an Islamic sense 
of solidarity, and therefore serves very well to counterbalance the radicalizing elements for 
which poverty provides a hotbed.
The second is the sense of “threat.” Concentration on politics stems largely from 
Western concerns, even only implicitly, with political and security threats the Islamic world 
may pose against the Western countries. Peaceful struggles for “bread and salt” in the daily 
life of Muslims, based on Islamic values, do not seem to be what the specialists of political 
Islam are troubled by.
On the other hand, the concept of Islamic revival concerns itself very much with daily 
life of Muslims, since one important issue to apprehend is why and how Muslims decided 
to “return” to religious values to survive in this modern world. Area Studies, by definition, 
aims at understanding the target society and the people living in it. Revolutions, wars, civil 
strife, assassinations and other political events, may attract students of Area Studies. But more 
importantly, though it is often more difficult, we should look at what is unspoken, because 
here we find what is taken for granted as the postulates of a given society, that is too apparent 
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and too common for the people to refer to. In politics, we should seek to sense what is in their 
hearts, not only out spoken words and political discourses.
When we talk about democracy or democratization in the Arab countries, we may talk 
more about the lack of it, since there are not many manifestations of democracy, if judged by 
the political standards of developed countries. When we listen to what people feel inwardly, 
however, we notice that they sense the tyranny of men in power and they wish their own 
voices to be heard. They clearly demand what is “democratic” for them, if not democracy in 
the strict sense of the word. The Islamic ideal of justice may be pronounced by the ulama, 
and even by the tyrants for the sake of their legitimization. Do the people distrust the Islamic 
justice? Not necessarily, because they firmly confirm their acute sense of being oppressed 
through the Islamic concept of ẓulm (oppression, injustice), mirroring the concept of justice.
Based on observations through my own fieldworks, survey of the literature as well as 
the informed opinions of my colleagues, there are at least five major manifestations of Islamic 
revival. They are wide spread in the following descending order: 1) Building mosques and 
promoting daily prayers; 2) Collecting obligatory and voluntary alms (zakāt and ṣadaqa) and 
developing social welfare and mutual support; 3) Preparing and going to pilgrimage (ḥajj) 
to the sacred land; 4) Flourishing of Islamic financial institutions; and 5) Islamic activities 
in constitutional, legal and political domains. The last one sometimes involves radical 
and extremist elements. Attention by the mass media as well as academic specialists is in 
ascending order from the bottom.
In a nutshell, a grass-roots Islamic revival spreads worldwide, and then, its economic 
and political manifestation in non-violent forms becomes more prevalent, while some political 
organizations adopt radical, and sometimes violent, ways to change their societies. Grass-root 
practices of Islamic revival are certainly discernible for those who live in the given society, 
but often ignored by observers.
We certainly need to pay attention not only to the major trends and the moderates, 
but also to radical and extremist groups. The radicals are numerically a minority but they 
may possess the means to disturb the majority formation, by representing the frustrated and 
disparate elements of a society. Again, even for that sake, we need to locate the radicals in the 
entire spectrum of the Islamic revival, so that we can grasp both the moderate and the radical.
Concluding remarks
All researchers serve their societies first, and then the global society. It goes without saying 
that Japanese studies related to Muslim societies have been operating within the context 
of Japan and the international context in which Japan is situated. Since Japan lost colonial 
domination totally at the end of World War II, it chose to be a “peaceful trading nation” 
and sought to be friendly with most countries, if not all, including Islamic ones. This was 
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counterbalanced by primacy of cooperation with the developed countries, and other political 
and economic considerations, as with the case of “oil crises” discussed in this article.
The objectivity of any researcher in the scientific sense and his/her social responsibility 
within the context of his/her professional academic endeavors must be always considered. It is 
also imperative today to consider the responsibility of a researcher in the global context, since 
we are all contributing to the accumulated common knowledge of mankind, which should 
serve the common good of mankind as a whole, or the common good of the global society 
comprising both humans and the earth. It is my firm conviction that Japanese academic 
approaches to the Islamic world and to Muslim societies, as described in this article, are non-
hegemonic, seeking a middle ground for peaceful co-existence, or to use our new terminology, 
for a sustainable humanosphere,16 and can contribute to an appropriate understanding suitable 
for the 21st century.
※ This work is part of the achievements of the NIHU Area Studies Project for Modern Middle 
East, and also part of Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) on “Constructing the Study 
of Islam Appropriate for the Global Era of the 21st Century,” supported by JSPS KAKENHI 
Grant Number JP25243004.
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A Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu and Yasushi Kosugi (eds.), Intellectuals in the Modern 
Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation, Communication, London: Routledge.
———. 2011. Formation of Civilization and State in Islam. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. (in 
Japanese)
———. 2014. “Islamic Economics and Halal Philosophy of Life,” Kyoto-Durham 
International Workshop in Islamic Economics and Finance, 2014, on 25 August 2014.
Kosugi, Yasushi and Shinsuke Nagaoka. 2010. Islamic Banking: Finance and International 
Economy. Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan. (in Japanese)
Al-Manār (CD-ROM al-Manār 1898–1935, with indices). 2003. Supervised by Yasushi 
Kosugi, Kyoto: COE-ASAFAS, Kyoto University.
03英特_01_kosugi_ver3.indd   18 2017/03/27   15:05:39
